The exclusive purpose of all procedural initiatives of the president/intervenor in the Grúas Case, Fernando Clavijo, the main protagonist of the investigated events --and for which two of his former subordinates are charged during his time as mayor-- is to delay.
The press of the Regime has put on a grotesque spectacle because in the heading of the Order of postponement of Clavijo's statement as an accused, he appeared as an intervenor. He is no longer accused! It would be necessary to explain to Pomares, Lourdes Santana, Millet and company that this heading is not part of the Order. But, above all, that in the summons to Clavijo to declare as an investigated party, he also appeared as an "intervenor". So?
Clavijo knows that he is accused. Even Antonio Doreste, in his particular "separate vote", takes it for granted.
The Investigating Judge intended to base her refusal to summon the current mayor as an accused on the fact that he had not signed (but Clavijo and Pérez-Godiño, the first accused) any Decree.
The Provincial Court, revoking the judge's decision, ordered José Alberto Díaz to be summoned as an accused for the "issuance of favorable Reports and Proposals" to the granting of a loan and the extension of the concession to the company Auto Grúas Poli, despite repeated warnings of illegality made by the Municipal Intervention.
But it was Clavijo who issued the Decrees of the Mayor's Office 858 and 1284 of 2014 "lifting" the objections of illegality and paved the way to give a loan in public money and extend the concession of the management of the cranes to an insolvent company that seriously failed to comply with its contractual obligations. Which had, by legal and contractual imperative --as the officials concluded in a legal report that Clavijo hid for three years--, to have been sanctioned by the termination of the contract and the rescue of the concession.
Clavijo plays to buy time, through delaying maneuvers, to confuse public opinion.
He pretends to appear that he is not accused.
He pretends to simulate that he is willing to cooperate with justice.
He continues trying to get rid of the Statute of Autonomy, which makes all Canarians equal before the law, and continue enjoying a jurisdiction that no longer exists.
The investigating judge, after warning Clavijo that he should clarify "if he is asking for the suspension of the statement, and in that case it will be provided", agreed to that postponement without Clavijo asking for it. And without being informed "of the result of such announcement" of the Cassation Appeal, that is, of its admission to processing, the other essential condition set by the judge herself to agree to the postponement of Clavijo's statement as an accused.
Why didn't Clavijo expressly ask for the postponement? Because with that request he himself would have denied his announcement/bluff that he was going to cooperate with ordinary justice.
At that moment someone should have come to the rescue, to ask the judge to order the postponement without date of Clavijo's statement, without anyone having requested the postponement or accredited the admission to processing of the cassation appeal. The judge flagrantly contradicted her own resolution and her own demands, showing off her striking resistance to investigate this Case. It is not difficult to imagine who could, with the necessary ascendancy, do that management. In my mental scheme, I identify that character as "factor D".
The Law of Civil Procedure only admits a cassation appeal against judicial orders "when the law expressly authorizes said appeal" or "when they involve the termination of the process due to lack of jurisdiction or free dismissal". It is palpable that it does not apply to the Grúas Case, because there is no law that expressly establishes that the Order denying Clavijo's Plea against the return of the investigation to the Court of La Laguna is appealable in cassation, nor does said Order involve the termination of the process. Quite the opposite.
Let's now contemplate the suspensive effects of the cassation appeal in the criminal process. If what is appealed in cassation is a conviction sentence, the suspension of the sentence derives from the most elementary legal logic: because, otherwise, by complying with the Sentence, the appeal would be deprived of utility: prematurely imprisoning, for example, a convicted person who could then be acquitted if the Supreme Court upheld the appeal and revoked the conviction.
In the case of a cassation appeal against an Order "that involves the termination of the process", discussing the suspension of the order makes no sense. There is nothing to execute, nor to suspend, because the process has ended. There is no sentence to postpone. Nor any preventive prisoner to release, because he would already be on the street. End of quote.
Giving rope to Clavijo's delaying strategy means blocking the investigation of the Grúas Case. Which, like any other, has a time limit established by the reform, carried out in 2015, of the Criminal Procedure Law.
What are we talking about then? Simply, as we stated at the beginning, about Clavijo's delaying maneuvers. And about the incomprehensible welcome that the investigating judge gives him.
