The plenary of the Supreme Court has issued two judgments in which it declares that the communities of owners can prohibit the activity of tourist rentals through agreements adopted in the meeting by a majority of three-fifths.
In two judgments dated September 25 to which Efe has had access, the Chamber has ruled for the first time on the 2019 decree of urgent measures regarding housing and rent.
What the Supreme Court has clarified is whether the prohibition of tourist activities described in the Urban Leasing Law (LAU) must be adopted by a majority of three-fifths or by unanimity of the owners.
The magistrates consider the prohibition in the statutes of a community of owners of renting homes for tourist use to be lawful.
The prohibition of using private elements in the horizontal property regime is legitimate and in accordance with the Constitution, the Supreme Court adds, referring to the doctrine already expressed by the Constitutional Court.
The horizontal property law rejects that it is a case of interpretation of a statutory norm under restrictive conditions and concludes that, according to the grammatical, semantic and literal criteria, the term "limit" does not exclude prohibition.
The 2019 Law justifies the adoption of urgent measures given the difficulties of accessing rental housing due to the increase in rents, an increase that is due, among other factors, to the growing phenomenon of tourist rentals.
Therefore, the Supreme Court considers that allowing the veto with that majority of three-fifths is a proportionate measure; furthermore, it highlights that if this majority of three-fifths is not admitted, the vote against the owner of the apartment in which the activity is intended to be carried out would be enough to prevent the adoption of the agreement.
The Supreme Court endorses that communities veto tourist rentals by a three-fifths majority
The prohibition of using private elements in the horizontal property regime is legitimate and in accordance with the Constitution, the Supreme Court adds, referring to the doctrine already expressed by the Constitutional Court.









