In a democracy, the electoral system is not a simple law, it is the framework that distributes political representation, and therefore power, in a human community. The Canary Islands, in the First Transitional Provision of its Statute of Autonomy, establish an electoral system which is substantially marked by the territorial issue, and what derives from it, from the dispute between the capital islands, to the historical inequalities between some territories and others. This system allows representing the seven constituencies equally based on the seven islands, over-representing the inhabitants of the less populated islands, under-representing those of the most populated ones, and with an arithmetic called triple parity that equates the deputies elected by the two capital islands among themselves, both with the rest of the islands of the Archipelago, and those elected by the two provinces among themselves.
The disproportion in the value of the vote is a perfectly understandable and necessary imperfection, in addition to being used recurrently in electoral systems around the world, with the intention of improving territorial representation and balancing the distribution of power in a fragmented place like ours; however, the triple parity system has proven to be deeply imperfect and absolutely ineffective for this purpose.
If the fundamental objective of triple parity is that the deputies elected by the island constituency defend with equal force the issues of their respective islands and that they owe themselves, therefore, to the demands of these and their people, the Canarian parliamentary history yields a resounding certainty: on rare occasions has the voting discipline been broken in the Parliament of the Canary Islands (one hand would suffice, and fingers would be left over), and never, ever, has it been done due to differences of the deputies from the non-capital islands in relation to the decisions that were going to be taken by the executive or the Canarian legislature.
And there has been no shortage of reasons, the last one in the 2017 budgets when the deputies for Lanzarote of the Canarian Coalition and PSOE raised their hands in favor of some autonomous budgets that did not contemplate a single euro cent for a majority demand on the island: the Radiotherapy Unit.
In addition to the fact that the influence of the parliamentarians of the non-capital islands on the affairs of their island/constituency is more than questionable when analyzing the abyss that exists at all levels between the capital and non-capital islands: null presence of autonomous administration, notorious lack of infrastructure and investment, or the scarcity of resources in basic issues such as transport, health, education, or justice in the non-capital islands, and that are even causing serious problems such as the loss of population in El Hierro.
What is the standard of the Canarian electoral system: the island constituency, and the plus of this that imposes triple parity in the non-capital islands, is diluted like a sugar cube in the parliamentary dynamics itself, and within the parties themselves swallowed by their own machinery located in Gran Canaria or Tenerife.
Faced with this palpable reality, that neither in the legislative nor in the autonomous executive does triple parity represent a substantial fact for the improvement of the situation of the non-capital islands, only two arguments are wielded that are more in the dimension of desire than of reason: that it could have been worse; and that the mere presence of citizens elected by Lanzarote, El Hierro, La Gomera, Fuerteventura or La Palma already demands the elaboration of specific programs for these islands. Both reasons without any scientific rigor, both complementary issues, which pass tangentially over the objective of an electoral system, dependent on the will of the actors involved in the process and also improper of their speakers, some Presidents of Cabildos.
And it seems more than evident that those who want to take the debate to decide on triple parity without nuances, do not do so in the search for a process of altruistic reflection and in favor of the common good, but pursue some particular interest, probably use the fallacious subterfuge of the defense of the non-capital islands to perpetuate a status quo that benefits them.
And for this they are capable of going from threats to donning a nationalist disguise to demand that the electoral system be decided here; the same disguise that they kept in a trunk and under lock and key, displaying tremendous hypocrisy, when in 1996 they applauded the rise of the electoral ceilings in Madrid.
No one doubts the need for a territorial correction factor in the Canarian electoral system, on the contrary, it is the starting point from which any proposal should start; but, of course, it would be cutting off the debate from the Canarian citizenry, and the possibilities of improving the non-capital islands in an electoral reform, if with spurious intentions it was intended to place triple parity as the only valid territorial correction factor in the debate.
In fact, it is especially insulting for the non-capital islands, not only that they receive childish treatment from their political representatives in the heat of ridiculous metaphors about athletic races (as in the Manifesto signed by five Presidents of Cabildo, the four of the Canarian Coalition and the other of ASG), but that they underestimate the political and social maturity of the six non-capital islands to take advantage of the unbeatable context of opportunity that opens up before the reform of the Canarian Electoral System to include a more effective territorial correction factor, which has real and legal repercussions on them, not exclusively in inflating their representation in a Parliament with a strong voting discipline, but associated with budget items, basic services, or the real decentralization of power.
Examples of this exist in various political systems around the world, and neither Lanzarote, nor La Palma, nor Fuerteventura, nor La Gomera nor El Hierro, nor La Graciosa, are in a position to let pass the possibility of taking advantage of the changing situation to distance themselves from the false dichotomy imposed by the Canarian Coalition of "either triple parity or centralism" and affirm without fear that the Canary Islands project born from the Statute of 1982 is obsolete, that it relegates them to the periphery in decision-making in the Archipelago, and that, for all this, a reform of the electoral system is demanded that allows us, once and for all, those of us who live here, to equalize in rights and opportunities, as well as to have real decision-making power over what happens here.
*Borja Rubio, councilor and spokesperson for Somos Lanzarote in the Arrecife City Council