Lanzarote has not reached the stage of other islands where fountain grass occupies large areas and its eradication is much more difficult, but it cannot be said that the problem has been solved either. The current situation is one of early warning and RedEXOS maintains that continued work has significantly reduced its presence. However, behind this relatively good news lies an administrative story that begins at least in 2014 and raises an uncomfortable question: if Lanzarote knew since then that fountain grass could be eradicated, knew the main pathways of expansion, and had protocols to combat it, why twelve years later does the plant continue to appear precisely on roads, altered land, abandoned agricultural areas, and places where waste and debris accumulate?
The opportunity Lanzarote had and that the documents left written
The story does not begin in 2026. Nor in 2017. It begins, at the very least, in 2014, when the Government of the Canary Islands approved specific guidelines for the management, control, and elimination of fountain grass. That document classified Pennisetum setaceum as one of the most harmful invasive alien species in the Archipelago and accurately described its main pathways of expansion: roads, degraded land, soil accumulations, and altered areas. But it also contained a decisive consideration for Lanzarote: prevention, early warning, and rapid action could still allow the eradication of the species on the island. The Canary Islands then distinguished between Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, La Gomera, and El Hierro, where control was still manageable, and Tenerife, Gran Canaria, and La Palma, where the main objective should be to curb expansion.
In other words, Lanzarote was not facing an inevitable problem. It had an officially recognized window of opportunity and had also identified the places through which the plant could advance. This fact turns the following years into more than just a succession of environmental campaigns. It allows us to ask how much that opportunity was taken advantage of and, above all, what happened to the preventive measures that should have prevented the problem from growing.
2017: the diagnosis was already alarming
Three years later, the Cabildo of Lanzarote launched a specific eradication campaign between June and September 2017 and hired technical assistance to understand the distribution of invasive flora in Lanzarote and La Graciosa. The technicians covered all the roads and population centers on the island and geolocated the detected populations.
The result was much more serious than a simple isolated presence. The 2017 study detected 59 species of invasive flora, grouped into 47 taxa. Of these, 32 species, grouped into 20 taxa, were spread throughout the island's territory. Rabogato ranked first in the so-called TOP-20 Lanzarote 2017 due to its capacity for dispersal and colonization of agricultural areas and recent volcanic terrain.
The report also warned that several invasive species were already reaching particularly sensitive areas and established that populations present in protected natural areas should be considered priority intervention points. This data is especially relevant because that document did not limit itself to describing the problem, but rather identified concrete mechanisms that could be aggravating it.
The road: when cleaning could favor invasion
The 2017 report contains one of the most uncomfortable conclusions in this entire story. The technicians found that certain procedures used to treat the roadsides were favoring the spread of rabogato and other invasive species. When cleaning operations removed all vegetation and disturbed the substrate, precisely the favorable conditions for invasive species to establish themselves were created.
The document does not use journalistic interpretation. It states it expressly: it was necessary to improve the work procedures applied to the roadsides and train the operators in the knowledge and treatment of native and invasive species.
The gravity of this conclusion lies in the fact that it was not a theory about what could happen. Technicians claimed to have verified it during fieldwork. In other words, while some crews might have been uprooting rabogato specimens to try to prevent its spread, certain ordinary cleaning tasks could have been creating new favorable spaces for the plant to re-establish itself. The fight against the invasive species and the management of the road could have been moving in opposite directions. This is one of the points that a complete investigation should verify contract by contract.
Aggregates: another open door
The same report found another problem. Stockpiles of aggregates used for various projects could act as a means of dispersal for invasive species. Technicians provided a specific example on the access track to Playa de la Madera, in Tinajo, near the border of Timanfaya National Park: the aggregates imported to repair the track had introduced, according to the report, at least two invasive species, one exotic and one native species that had been moved.
The journalistic consequence is evident. If the materials used in a construction project can transport invasive species, the origin and control of aggregates cease to be a secondary issue. They become part of conservation policy. And that leads directly to a question that still requires a complete documentary answer: how many projects executed in Lanzarote between 2014 and 2026 incorporated specific controls on aggregates, soil, machinery, and material movements to prevent the spread of rabogato?
Gardens and waste: the problem was also being manufactured at home
The 2017 diagnosis went even further. Technicians identified public and private garden areas as one of the main entry and dispersal routes for invasive species. Plants could move from gardens to the edges of streets, paths, and roads, vacant lots, and other residual spaces. But there was another problem: garden waste. The report noted the proliferation of invasive species favored by the improper disposal of pruning waste and discarded specimens. Therefore, it recommended establishing systems to prevent waste dumping points from gardens and promoting common island guidelines to regulate public and private green areas.
It was not, therefore, exclusively a matter of nature. It was also a matter of waste management, public gardening, urban planning, roads, and citizen behavior. And the report called for precisely something that remains essential: a coordinated island strategy, with common criteria for municipalities and specific regulations on the management, control, and eradication of invasive species.
The diagnosis was expanded, but the response had to be permanent
The 2017 report left another decisive warning: invasive species could not be combated exclusively through isolated campaigns. It recommended maintaining an island-wide early warning system through continuous monitoring of roads and population centers, in addition to citizen participation.
This is especially relevant when observing the subsequent evolution. In 2014, the discussion was about prevention and early warning; in 2017, continuous monitoring was called for, improvements to road procedures were requested, garden waste was to be controlled, and common island guidelines were to be established. In 2026, RedEXOS continues to locate the rabogato mainly along roads, abandoned agricultural land, and disturbed areas where waste and debris are deposited. The problem identified nine years ago has not disappeared.
Twelve years later, Lanzarote continues to pay the bill for control
The current situation presents a paradox. On the one hand, RedEXOS considers that Lanzarote is on early alert and that continuous actions have considerably reduced the presence of the rabogato. Since 2020, there has been a permanent team of two people on the island, after a period in which teams from Gran Canaria carried out specific actions.
On the other hand, the volume of actions demonstrates that surveillance continues to be necessary. Until September 14, 2026, RedEXOS had recorded 1,205 actions, 1,060 follow-ups, and 137 extractions. The plant has been located in all seven municipalities of Lanzarote.
These numbers alone do not demonstrate a management failure. On the contrary, they can precisely reflect the functioning of an early warning system. But they do demonstrate something indisputable: twelve years after the Canary Islands considered it still possible to eradicate the rabogato in Lanzarote, the island needs to continue dedicating human and economic resources to locate it, extract it, and re-check the same places. And that is the bill that deserves to be investigated.
The missing data: how much has been spent and how many times the same place has been revisited
The problem is not that there is no documentation. There is a lot. In 2014, the Cabildo had already carried out a study on invasive flora and a management and control plan. The 2017 report itself recalls that work and points out that 29 invasive or potentially invasive exotic species and three relocated native species had been included at that time. By 2017, the inventory had risen to 59 species of invasive flora.
The 2017 report also incorporated a specific file and mapping of the rabogato, with individual records of the enclaves where specimens had been located. This means that there is an extraordinary opportunity to measure the real effectiveness of public policies. It is not enough to know that 1,205 actions have been carried out by RedEXOS. It is necessary to know how many correspond to new outbreaks and how many to recurrences, how many points treated in 2017 reappeared later, which roads concentrated the actions, which outbreaks were located within or next to protected natural areas, what works or earth movements were carried out in the vicinity, and, above all, how much public money was allocated year after year to combat the species. Without this cross-referencing of data, talking about success or failure would be premature. With it, we could measure it.
The mismanagement that is indeed documented
The investigation does not need to exaggerate to be conclusive. There are sufficiently serious facts in themselves. In 2014, the Government of the Canary Islands knew that Lanzarote could still eradicate the rabogato. In 2017, the Cabildo had to launch a specific campaign because the proliferation was already considered alarming. In 2017, the rabogato held the top spot among priority invasive species in Lanzarote. In 2017, technicians confirmed that certain road cleanings could favor its expansion. In 2017, technicians documented that certain aggregates used in a construction project had introduced invasive species. In 2017, it was found that gardening waste could favor the proliferation of invasive species, and a coordinated island strategy and continuous monitoring were called for. In 2026, RedEXOS continues to find the rabogato on roads, abandoned agricultural land, and altered areas with waste and debris.
The sum of these facts does not automatically allow us to accuse an Administration, a company, or a political official of having caused the expansion. But it does allow us to state that the problem of prevention was identified long before the problem of invasion disappeared. And that is the real management gap that this investigation must continue to explore.
An island that avoided disaster but failed to close the door
Lanzarote is not Tenerife, it is not Gran Canaria, and it is not La Palma, and it would be incorrect to present its current situation as an ecological catastrophe comparable to that of those islands. RedEXOS maintains that the situation is under control and that continued intervention has considerably reduced the presence of the rabogato. Precisely for this reason, the case is more interesting: Lanzarote had the opportunity to eradicate it when it was still possible.
The Administration knew where it was, knew where it was spreading, knew which actions could favor it, knew that isolated campaigns were not enough, knew that roads, gardens, plots, waste, and earthworks needed to be monitored, and knew that coordination was necessary. Twelve years later, the rabogato continues to appear in many of those same places.
The good news is that Lanzarote can still keep it under control. The bad news is that an early warning that lasts twelve years stops being a simple alarm and becomes a permanent management obligation. The pending research is simple to formulate: how much has it cost to keep a species at bay that in 2014 could still be eradicated, and how many times have the same hotspots had to be revisited because the conditions that allowed its return never disappeared?
Because the problem was not just to pull out the cat's tail. The problem was to prevent it from returning. And if the same vectors identified by technicians almost a decade ago are still the places where RedEXOS finds the plant today, the question is no longer whether it was known what needed to be done. The question is how much of what was known was actually applied.
Main documentary sources
• Government of the Canary Islands, Order of June 13, 2014, Technical guidelines for the management, control, and elimination of rabogato.
• Lanzarote Biosphere Reserve, 2017 Invasive Flora Species Monitoring Report, prepared by the Environmental Studies Office.
• Government of the Canary Islands, Biodiversity Database, Cenchrus setaceus file.
• RedEXOS / Government of the Canary Islands, information on the situation and the early warning system.
• La Voz de Lanzarote, September 19, 2026, current RedEXOS data for Lanzarote: 1,205 actions, 1,060 follow-ups, and 137 extractions as of September 14.
• Government of the Canary Islands, environmental documentation and files related to the control of invasive alien species and dispersion through machinery, vehicles, and earthmoving.
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