The blackout on October 3 cannot be explained solely by a breakdown in Mácher. Behind those hours without electricity lies a much longer story, marked by projects that have been on the table for years, infrastructure whose completion has been prolonged over time, facilities that need modernization, and energy planning that, at certain times, seems to have lagged behind the needs of an island that has not stopped growing.
Lanzarote was plunged into darkness in the early hours of October 3 and once again realized how dependent it is on an energy infrastructure essential for practically all aspects of daily life. The energy blackout began at 5:44 AM with an incident on the 66 kV grid of the Mácher substation, in Tías, which initially affected approximately 51,703 customers. Four minutes later, during restoration maneuvers, a new incident at the San Bartolomé and Punta Grande substations caused a loss of generation and increased the affected customers to approximately 73,600. Playa Blanca remained outside the blackout thanks to its connection with Fuerteventura.
It was not, therefore, a simple power outage. The energy blackout also affected water production because the desalination plants stopped functioning normally and forced the Government of the Canary Islands to activate the pre-alert of the PLATECA due to the impact on basic supplies. On an island that depends on desalination to guarantee its supply, electricity and water are part of the same equation, so that a large-scale interruption ceases to be exclusively an energy problem and becomes a matter of security and the functioning of essential services.
And that is where the real reflection should begin, because Lanzarote did not suddenly lose power.
The problem did not start on October 3
The technical explanation of the breakdown will have to be determined through the investigation announced by the administrations and system operators, but there is another issue that should be part of that investigation and goes far beyond locating the specific component that failed that early morning: why a localized incident could end up causing an energy blackout of these dimensions and what planned infrastructure to reduce this vulnerability is still pending.
The case of the electrical axis between Mácher and Playa Blanca is especially significant. It is not an action conceived after the blackout, but a project whose processing dates back much further. Official documentation shows that it was submitted for public information in December 2010 and that in May 2016 it received administrative authorization, approval of the execution project, and a declaration of public utility.
The data becomes even more relevant when observing the current situation. In May 2026, the Government of the Canary Islands incorporated into its Strategic Subsidy Plan aid to the Cabildo of Lanzarote for the Playa Blanca-Mácher project, specifically for the undergrounding of the 132 kV double-circuit electrical energy transport between both towns, with an expected validity period for 2026-2027 and with an expressly defined objective: to improve the guarantee of the electrical supply.
The chronology is difficult to ignore. The project was already in public information in 2010, was authorized in 2016, and in 2026 there are still actions associated with its completion. It is not necessary to state that someone wanted to solve the problem to ask a legitimate question: why does an infrastructure considered necessary so many years ago continue to require actions to complete its function when Lanzarote is once again suffering an episode of these characteristics?
It cannot be said that nothing has been invested
It would be unfair to present this story as if nothing had been done all these years. Available data show a different reality. Red Eléctrica assures that since 2011 it has invested around 268 million euros in Lanzarote and Fuerteventura in new networks and in renovation, improvement, and maintenance works, in addition to having built seven new substations, including those in Playa Blanca, Tías, and Callejones.
Also in 2022, the new 132 kV submarine link between Lanzarote and Fuerteventura came into operation, which reinforced the existing interconnection since 2005 and provided a second connection route, precisely to increase the robustness of the system and improve maintenance conditions.
The blackout itself has demonstrated the usefulness of that infrastructure. While a large part of Lanzarote remained without supply, Playa Blanca was able to maintain it thanks to its connection with Fuerteventura. It is practical evidence of what redundancy means: when an alternative route exists and can be used, part of the system can be protected against a failure that affects the rest.
That is why the debate should not be framed in terms of whether or not investment has been made, because it is documented that investment has been made. The truly important issue is something else: whether those investments have arrived on time, whether they have been sufficient to accompany the island's growth, and whether the grid has the necessary redundancy to prevent a localized incident from having island-wide consequences again.
When planning lags behind reality
Over the past few decades, Lanzarote has undergone a profound transformation. The population and tourist activity have increased, new residential and hotel areas have been developed, and needs related to water, public services, commerce, and mobility have grown. Electricity has ceased to be just another piece of infrastructure and has become the essential support for practically all others, from water production to communications, health centers, tourist establishments, and economic activity.
That is why it is insufficient to consider electrical planning as an exclusively technical matter. When an island depends on electricity to produce water and keep a large part of its essential services running, guaranteeing the supply is also a matter of island security. And precisely for this reason, the difference between an announced infrastructure and a completed infrastructure, between an authorized project and a truly operational line, becomes so important, because during the years that separate these two moments, the island's reality continues to change.
The history of Mácher and Playa Blanca clearly illustrates this gap between planning and execution. The project was documented more than fifteen years ago, authorized a decade ago, and even in 2026, actions related to its completion and undergrounding are still appearing. At the same time, the existing system has had to continue operating and responding to a demand that has not stopped growing.
The problem, therefore, does not lie in the absence of plans. The problem lies in the time that elapses between the identification of a need and the commissioning of the infrastructure intended to resolve it. An electrical grid cannot wait for demand to reach its limit to begin reinforcement, because when new infrastructure arrives too late, the island is already in a different situation and existing facilities have had to withstand increasing pressure for years.
A responsibility that should not be evaded
After an episode like the one on October 3rd, the question of who is responsible inevitably arises. The electrical system distributes competencies among different administrations and companies, with differentiated responsibilities in matters of planning, transport, generation, distribution, authorizations, territory, and emergencies. This division is technically necessary, but it can produce a consequence that the citizen clearly perceives when a crisis arrives: responsibilities are fragmented while consequences are concentrated.
The citizen does not live within this division of competencies. When the power goes out, it doesn't matter too much who should have authorized a work, who should have executed it, or who should have maintained an installation. Shops, hotels, homes, pumping systems, communications, and essential services stop, and on an island dependent on desalination, water production is also compromised.
That is why the investigation announced after the blackout should go beyond determining which component failed. It should also reconstruct the history of the planned infrastructures to prevent an incident from acquiring such scope, identify which actions were programmed, which were executed, which are still pending, and what reasons explain the accumulated delays.
It would not be necessary to turn this investigation into a search for culprits before knowing the facts. It would be enough to demand something much simpler and much more important: that each administration and each operator explain what responsibility they have, what action they were supposed to take, when it was scheduled, and at what point it currently stands.
Water makes the blackout much more serious
The episode of October 3 has also left evidence that Lanzarote should not forget. When the electricity disappeared, water production was also affected because desalination plants need an energy supply to function. The recovery of the electricity supply does not automatically mean the immediate recovery of water production, as the facilities need to stabilize and return to normal operation.
This dependence forces us to consider energy security from a much broader perspective. It is not just about a home being able to turn on the light or a business being able to open its doors, but about ensuring that critical infrastructure can continue to function when part of the system suffers a breakdown. This requires meshed networks, sufficient capacity, alternative connections, backup generation, and systems capable of limiting the scope of a failure.
In Lanzarote, moreover, energy security and water security are inevitably connected. This reality should occupy a central place in any future planning because the cost of an electrical failure is not limited to the hours when homes remain in the dark.
The uncomfortable question
Perhaps the most revealing image of the blackout is precisely that of Playa Blanca maintaining the supply while a large part of Lanzarote remained in the dark. Its connection with Fuerteventura allowed for an alternative route and demonstrated, in practice, the value of the redundancy that Red Eléctrica had pointed out when putting the new interconnection into service.
That is why the question left by the blackout should not be limited to determining who was to blame for the breakdown. The most important issue is why an infrastructure considered necessary so many years ago still requires action to fully achieve the security objectives that justified its planning. Asking this question does not mean accusing an administration or a company in advance, but rather demanding that the investigation explain where the gap between what was planned and what was executed has occurred.
And there appears an even more uncomfortable question: if the need was identified years ago, if there were projects, if there were authorizations, and if millions of euros have been invested, why does Lanzarote still have a vulnerability capable of turning an incident into an island-wide energy blackout?
Lanzarote does not need another plan
After the blackout, new reports, explanations, commitments, and investments will arrive, and all of them will be necessary. But Lanzarote needs something more difficult: that solutions stop being measured by the number of projects announced and begin to be measured by the number of completed, connected, and functioning infrastructures. The documentation shows that there has been planning and that there have also been significant investments, but it equally shows that certain actions considered strategic have been on the path from project to reality for many years.
That should be one of the main debates left by the blackout. It is not about denying what has been done, but about asking whether it has been done with the necessary speed and whether the planning model allows for anticipating the needs of an island that continues to grow. Because if an infrastructure takes years to go from planning to execution, during that time reality does not stand still: demand increases, services that depend on electricity grow, and existing facilities continue to support the system.
That is why the blackout of October 3 should not be reduced to a technical explanation of what happened that early morning. The investigation must determine what went wrong, but it should also explain why the system still needed certain actions that had been planned for years and what concrete measures will be taken to truly reduce the possibility of a future breakdown having island-wide consequences again.
The real problem is not that an electrical infrastructure can fail. Any system can. The problem arises when a localized breakdown has the capacity to compromise the functioning of an entire island for hours and when, moreover, some of the infrastructures intended to reduce that vulnerability have been waiting for years for their completion.
Lanzarote does not only need an explanation of why the power went out on October 3. It needs to know what has been done all these years, what was left pending, why it was left pending, and when it will finally be finished. It also needs the answers not to become another schedule of actions that in a few years will have to be reviewed again after another incident.
Because Lanzarote did not suddenly run out of electricity. The breakdown occurred on a specific early morning, but the vulnerability that made it possible for that breakdown to have such a dimension has been built up over many years. And that is, probably, the issue that should now worry us much more than the blackout itself: if we have known for years what infrastructure the island needs, why do we keep waiting for the problem to occur to talk about it again?
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